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ADDRESS TO THE A U S T R A L I A N A D M I N I S T R A T I V E S T A F F COLLEGE 
BY THE PREMIER OF SOUTH A U S T R A L I A , DON DUNSTAN. • 
12.2.74 
DR . K E L S A L E , MR. L O W E , ( L A D I E S AND) GENTLEMEN. 
THANK YOU FOR I N V I T I N G ME HERE TH IS E V E N I N G . 
I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SPEAK TO YOU ON COMMONWEALTH/STATE 
R E L A T I O N S H I P S . 
T H I S I S , FOR ANY A U S T R A L I A N STATE P R E M I E R , A F A S C I N A T I N G 
T O P I C , AND ONE WITH WHICH WE ARE QUITE F A M I L I A R . 
FOR INSTANCE I HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT COMMONWEALTH/STATE RELAT IONS 
IN E L E C T I O N CAMPAIGNS - OF HOW HAPPY THEY WOULD B E . 
.. ./2 
I HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT THEM IN CANBERRA - SAY ING HOW HAPPY 
THEY COULD B E . I HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT THEM WITH PRIME 
M I N I S T E R S - S A Y I N G HOW HAPPY THEY SHOULD B E . 
AND SO ON . . . AND ON. I DO NOT EXPECT THE S I T U A T I O N TO 
CHANGE. 
FOR IN A U S T R A L I A WE HAVE A FEDERAT ION OF WHAT A R E , 
T H E O R E T I C A L L Y , CO-EQUAL GOVERNMENTS. AND S I N C E IT I S , 
UNFORTUNATELY , OF THE VERY NATURE OF CO-EQUAL GOVERNMENTS 
IN FEDERAT IONS THAT SOME CONSIDER THEMSELVES MORE EQUAL 
THAN OTHERS, THE ARGUMENTS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY 
A R E , C A N BE EXPECTED TO CONT INUE . 
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TEN5 I0MS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS ARE I N E V I T A B L E IN F E D E R A T I O N S . 
THE TWO DEMOCRATIC FEDERAL SYSTEMS MOST COMPARABLE TO 
A U S T R A L I A ' S ARE C A N A D A ' S AND WEST G E R M A N Y ' S , AND BOTH DF 
THE5E SYSTEMS HAVE , AS AN INTEGRAL P O L I T I C A L FACT OF L I F E , 
VARIOUS PROBLEMS RELATED TO D I V I S I O N S OF POWERS WITHIN 
THE FEDERAL S Y S T E M S . THEIR ARGUMENTS AND CONCERNS ARE 
REMARKABLY S I M I L A R TO OURS. 
IN A U S T R A L I A WE HAVE A FEDERAL SYSTEM IN WHICH THE 
POWERS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ARE DEF INED IN THE 
FEDERAL C O N S T I T U T I O N . A L L POWERS NOT S P E C I F I C A L L Y INCLUDED 
THERE IN ARE IN RIGHT OF THE S T A T E S , AND FOR THE COMMONWEALTH 
TO ACQUIRE ADD IT IONAL POWERS, IT I S NECESSARY FOR A 
REFERENDUM TO BE HELD AND FOR THE PEOPLE OF A U S T R A L I A TO 
VOTE ON THE MATTER . 
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FURTHER , THE CONST ITUT ION IS BY DES IGN QUITE HARD TO 
CHANGE. THE POWERS OF THE STATES ARE PROTECTED TO THE 
EXTENT THAT ANY A L T E R A T I O N IN THE NATURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH'S 
AUTHORITY MUST HAVE AGREEMENT IN A REFERENDUM NOT ONLY 
OF A MAJORITY OF THE P E O P L E , BUT ALSO A MAJORITY OF THE 
PEOPLE IN A MAJORITY OF THE S T A T E S . 
THE SYSTEM MEANS THAT WE HAVE A REMARKABLY CONSERVAT IVE 
C O N S T I T U T I O N . OF THE TWENTY SEVEN ATTEMPTS MADE TO ALTER IT 
S I N C E 1 9 0 1 , ONLY F I V E HAVE BEEN S U C C E S S F U L . THE PEOPLE OF 
A U S T R A L I A HAVE SO FAR BEEN QUITE RELUCTANT TO CHANGE THE 
STATUS OF THE S T A T E S , OR ENLARGE BY BALLOT THE R E S P O N S I B I L I T I E S 
OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, EXCEPT IN C E R T A I N L I M I T E D WAYS. 
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T H I S RECORD, HOWEVER, I S IN CURIOUS CONTRAST TO THE GENERAL 
TENDENCY OF GOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES IN A U S T R A L I A . 
S I N C E FEDERAT ION THERE HAS BEEN A CONTINUAL D R I F T OF POWERS 
AND/OR OPTIONS TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN CANBERRA . THE 
MOST FUNDAMENTAL AND I L L U S T R A T I V E EXAMPLE OF TH IS PROCESS 
CAN BE SEEN IN THE UNIFORM TAXAT ION SYSTEM . THE STATES 
S T I L L HAVE THE POWER TO IMPOSE A FULL RANGE OF TAXES (WITH 
THE E X C E P T I O N OF CUSTOMS AND E X C I S E ) . HOWEVER, NO STATE 
GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO IMPOSE A SECOND SYSTEM OF 
TAXAT ION ON I T S P O P U L A T I O N , BECAUSE THE P O L I T I C A L D ISADVANTAGE 
OF DOING SO WOULD FAR OUTWEIGH THE CONST ITUT IONAL POINT SO 
G A I N E D . THE COMMONWEALTH IMPOSED, IN 1 9 4 2 , UNIFORM INCOME 
TAXAT ION AND IN DOING SO E S T A B L I S H E D P O L I T I C A L L Y AND L E G A L L Y 
I TS P R E - E M I N E N C E IN T H I S AREA IN IMPORTANT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
WAYS. 
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BUT THE I N T E R E S T I N G PART OF T H I S PROCESS I S NOT THAT IT HAS 
HAPPENED (OR I S H A P P E N I N G ) , BUT THAT IT HAS HAPPENED IN THE 
FACE OF A CONST ITUT ION WHICH PROTECTS THE S T A T E S , AND A 
POPULAT ION WHICH I S PREPARED TO DO SO A L S O . THUS , WITH 
VERY FEW E X C E P T I O N S , COMMONWEALTH/STATE R E L A T I O N S AND 
ACTIONS S I N C E FEDERAT ION HAVE BEEN DETERMINED MORE BY THE 
D E C I S I O N S OF THE VARIOUS E X E C U T I V E GOVERNMENTS AND THE 
COURTS, THAN BY THE PEOPLE IN A B A L L O T . 
HOWEVER, TH IS IS NOT N E C E S S A R I L Y A BAD P R O C E S S . 
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PAGE 7. 
THE COMPLEXITIES OF A POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY REQUIRE THAT 
CERTAIN GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCIES BE ACHIEVED AND IF IT IS 
MORE EFFICIENT FOR, SAY, A COMMONWEALTH TRANSPORT AUTHORITY 
TO CONTROL AND DEVELOP THE NATION'S GOODS-RAILWAY SYSTEMS, THEN 
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE CLEAR ADVANTAGES IN TRANSFERRING 
STATE RAILWAYS TO THE COMMONWEALTH. (IN FACT, WE ARE PREPARED 
TO DO SO IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, PROVIDED THAT WE RECEIVE PROPER 
UNDERTAKINGS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH THAT PEOPLE IN RURAL AREAS 
WILL NOT BE DISADVANTAGED BY THE CHANGE AND THAT THE STATE 
RETAINS CONTROL OF THE INTRA-CITY PUBLIC RAIL TRANSPORT SYSTEM). 
PAGE 8. 
THE SAME KIND OF ARGUMENT CAN BE USED TO SUPPORT COMMONWEALTH 
INVOLVEMENT IN AREAS SUCH AS, SAY, ROAD MAKING, TERTIARY 
EDUCATION, OR URBAN DECENTRALISATION AND REGIONAL PLANNING. 
SUCH AREAS ARE NOT ONLY CAPITAL INTENSIVE, BUT THEY ARE ALSO 
SO GENERAL IN PRINCIPLE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN AN ADMINISTRATIVELY 
ADVANTAGEOUS WAY. 
IN FACT, ONE CAN THINK OF A GREAT NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTAL 
FUNCTIONS THAT ARE CARRIED OUT BY BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT, AND IN MANY OF THESE THERE IS NO CONFLICT BECAUSE 
THE SPECIFIC INTERESTS OF THE STATES ARE NOT AT VARIANCE WITH 
THE GENERAL INTEREST OF THE COMMONWEALTH. INDEED, IN A REAL 
SENSE THE TWO GOVERNMENTAL ROLES CAN BE AND ARE OFTEN 
COMPLIMENTARY. 
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TAKE THE ENVIRONMENT AND CONSERVATION, FOR INSTANCE. VERY 
PEW PEOPLE WOULD ARGUE THAT IT IS BETTER TO HAVE A DIRTY 
ENVIRONMENT THAN REQUIRE THAT PRIVATE INDUSTRY CLEANS ITSELF 
UP; AND VERY FEW PEOPLE WOULD ARGUE THAT IT IS BETTER TO 
ALLOW THE LAND AND PROPERTY MARKET FULL REIN AND THUS NOT 
BE RESPONSIVE TO CONSERVATION OR PLANNING VALUES IN THE 
COMMUNITY. 
BOTH THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN AND COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS AGREE 
WITH THESE AIMS, AND AT PRESENT STATES LIKE MINE ARB ABLE TO 
RECEIVE ASSISTANCE FROM THE COMMONWEALTH IN THIS AREA. AND 
THIS I THINK IS AN IMPORTANT KIND OF QUALIFICATION TO BEAR 
IN MIND. 
PAGE 10. 
WHERE STATE AND COMMONWEALTH PRIORITIES ARE SIMILAR, IF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TENSIONS AND PROBLEMS EXIST, THEY ARE 
REALLY ONLY ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ARE QUITE EASILY SOLVED. 
BY AND LARGE, THIS IS BECAUSE, ON THE ONE HAND, THE 
COMMONWEALTH'S ACKNOWLEDGES ITS LACK OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE, 
WHILE ON THE OTHER, THE STATE RECOGNISES ITS LACK OF 
FINANCIAL POWER. 
HOWEVER, THE COMMONWEALTH'S CONTROL OF THE MAJOR TAXATION 
AREAS DOES NOT IN FACT AMOUNT TO AN OPEN TICKET FOR IT, 
IN A FUNDAMENTAL WAY, TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT 
OR ADMINISTRATION IN STATE AREAS. THE POLITICAL PRESSURES 
BROUGHT TO BEAR ON STATE ADMINISTRATIONS ARE OFTEN QUITE AS 
DIVERSE AND COMPLEX AS THOSE EXERTED UPON THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT. 
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THEY CAN, FOR INSTANCE, RANGE FROM THE A.M.A. TO INDUSTRY 
GROUPS ACROSS TO A SUBURBAN RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, OR A 
RURAL DISTRICT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. 
STATE PARLIAMENTS ARE LEGISLATIVELY COMPETENT (AND SHOULD 
CERTAINLY IN MY OPINION BE POLITICALLY COMPETENT) TO PASS 
GOOD LAWS ON MATTERS AS DIVERSE AS DRAINAGE AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, TOURISM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, TRAFFIC CODES AND 
CONSERVATION, TOWN PLANNING AND PUBLIC. HEALTH. 
I SHOULD CONTINUE THIS CATECHISM OF STATES' POWERS AND CONCERNS, 
BUT I THINK YOU WILL TAKE MY POINT. THE FACT IS THAT IN OUR 
FEDERAL SYSTEM THE POWERS AND CONCERNS OF STATE GOVERNMENTS ARE 
VERY WIDE AND COMPLEX, MID THEY DO NOT NECESSARILY AT ALL REFLECT 
THE POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL PRIORITIES OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. 
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IN FACT, AT TIMES THEY CAN BE REMARKABLY AT VARIANCE WITH THEM, 
FOR THE POLITICAL PRESSURES AND THE EXPECTATIONS OF ELECTORS ARE 
DIFFERENT FOR BACH GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA. 
THE PEOPLE AHD SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS OF EACH STATE 
REQUIRE, FOR INSTANCE, THAT EACH STATE GOVERNMENT ENDEAVOURS TO 
MAINTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT AND PROSPERITY THROUGH 
ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIES AND MARKETS. 
A COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT, FOR ITS OWN POLITICAL REASONS, M Y 
BELIEVE THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS WOULD BE BETTER SITED ELSEWHERE. 
SUCH A SITUATION COULD BE A POTENT SOURCE OF-CONFLICT BETWEEN 
GOVERNMENTS, ESPECIALLY IF OVERSEAS MARKETS OR INVESTMENT IS 
INVOLVED. 
THE NEED FOR REGIONALISATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IS THE 
ESSENTIAL ARGUMENT FOR A FEDERAL SYSTEM. IN A COUNTRY THE SIZE 
OF AUSTRALIA IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD EVOLVE. Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INTERESTS OF COLONIAL LEGISLATURES 
NATURALLY SOUGHT A SYSTEM WHICH PROTECTED THEIR POWERS AND 
BJ3ROGATIVES. THE RIGGED OR TIME CONSUMING NATURE OF INTER-
COLONIAL COMMUNICATIONS AT THE TIME OF FEDERATION ASSISTED IN 
THIS PROCESS. THUS FEDERATION WAS ACHIEVED IN A FAIRLY 
PAINLESS WAY. 
BUT NOW, AFTER 73 YEARS WE ARE DISCOVERING THAT FEDERATION HAS 
ITS INHERENT DISABILITIES AND INEFFICIENCIES. 
ON THE ONE HAND WE CAN HAVE A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WISHES 
TO COMMENCE PROJECTS OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE, BUT FINDS THAT ITS 
OTPIONS ARE LIMITED BY STATE GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION. ON THE OTHER 
HAND, WE CAN HAVE STATE GOVERNMENTS WRANGLING WITH THE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT - FOR PURELY PAROCHIAL POLITICAL GAIN. 
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IN ADDITION, WE CAN FIND THAT SOME PROJECTS MAY CROSS STATE 
BORDERS AND THUS INVOLVE TWO OR EVEN THREE GOVERNMENTS, WHILE 
IN THE MATTER OF RESOURCE USE, A STATE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY MAY 
BE AT QUITE RADICAL VARIANCE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S POLICY. 
NOW THIS MAY SOUND VERY INEFFICIENT, AND IN MANY RESPECTS IT 
OFTEN IS. (FOR INSTANCE, IT IS OBVIOUSLY INEFFICIENT FOR THE 
NATION AS A WHOLE NOT TO HAVE UNIFORM COMPANIES LEGISLATION 
OR AUDIT PROVISIONS). BUT I WOULD LIKE TONIGHT TO ARGUE AN 
ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PROPOSITION, NAMELY THAT A LITTLE 
INEFFICIENCY IS OFTEN A GOOD THING. 
THE CONVINCED CENTRALIST USUALLY HAS TWO BASIC ARGUMENTS TO 
MAKE, THE FIRST BEING THAT STATE GOVERNMENTS ARE INEFFICIENT AND 
COSTLY, AND THE SECOND BEING THAT THE BIGGER THE GOVERNMENT THE 
BETTER AND MORE RESPONSIBLE IT IS. 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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BUT WHAT IS USUALLY MEANT BY EFFICIENCY IN THIS CONTEXT IS 
WHETHER X GOVERNMENT AGREES WITH THE POLICY OF Y GOVERNMENT 
AND WILL COOPERATE WITH Y IN ACHIEVING IT. IF X DOES NOT AGREE, 
THE FEDERATION IS INEFFICIENT AND UNNECESSARILY COSTLY. WHEN 
IT COMES TO THE SECOND ARGUMENT THAT THE BIGGER THE GOVERNMENT 
THE BETTER AND MORE RESPONSIBLE IT IS, WE ARE IN A SIMILAR 
SITUATION. IT IS THE PROPONENT OF A POLICY THAT TRANSCENDS 
STATE BOUNDARIES WHO WILL INSIST THAT BIGGER GOVERNMENTS ARE 
INTRINSICALLY BETTER, OR MORE RESPONSIBLE OR MORE EXPERT. 
TO MY MIND, NEITHER ARGUMENT CAN BE PROPERLY SUSTAINED. FOR 
INSTANCE MY GOVERNMENT IS SMALLER IN SIZE MINISTERIALLY AND 
ADMINISTRATIVELY THAN, SAY THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT OR THE 
GOVERNMENTS OF NEW SOUTH WALES OR EVEN QUEENSLAND. 
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AND YET OUR POLICIES ARE NOT INTRINSICALLY SMALLER, THOUGH 
PERHAPS TO IMPLEMENT THEM IS CHEAPER. 
THE DIVERSITY AND QUALITY OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM CAN BE WELL 
UNDERSTOOD IF ONE COMPARED SOUTH AUSTRALIA'S LACK OF HUMBUG 
IN RESPECT OF BOOK CENSORSHIP WITH QUEENSLAND'S QUAINT 
PRUDERY IN THE MATTER. 
ALTERNATIVELY, COMPARE SOUTH AUSTRALIA'S URBAN CONSERVATION 
PROCEDURES WITH THOSE OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND VICTORIA'S 
STREET SITUATION. IT COULD NOT HAPPEN IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA. 
FOR REASONS LIKE THESE, THEN, GOVERNMENTAL DIVERSITY IN 
AUSTRALIA IS, I BELIEVE, A POSITIVE QUALITY, NOT A HINDRANCE. 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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FOR EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE ARGUED THAT A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
SHOULD BE ENLIGHTENED AND EFFECTIVE, AND GIVEN THE GOVERNMENTAL 
AND LEGISLATIVE SCOPE, WOULD BE SO, THE ARGUMENT FOR A TRANSFER 
OF STATE PREROGATIVES TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST THIS 
PROCESS DOES NOT REALLY COVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A LESS 
ENLIGHTENED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EMERGING. 
DIVERSITY OF GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA EFFECTIVELY ENVISAGES 
THAT THE PEOPLE OF, SAY, WESTERN AUSTRALIA OR TASMANIA OR 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA ARE NOT SIMPLY DEALT WITH AS IF THEY ARE SOME 
VAGUE STATISTIC OF NO ELECTORAL WEIGHT OR IMPORTANCE. 
IN EFFECT, THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATURES IN AUSTRALIA 
PROVIDE FOR A VERY HIGH DEGREE OF CONTACT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT 
AND CITIZENS. 
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MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT DO NOT, AS THEY DO IN FOR INSTANCE, THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, BALLOT TO ASK THEIR THREE OR SO QUESTIONS A 
YEAR OF THE GOVERNMENT. MEMBERS KNOW THEY ARE DEALING WITH THE 
INTERESTS OF A COMMUNITY IN WHICH THEY ARE PERSONALLY AND . 
ELECTORALLY INVOLVED. THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN SOME OF THE 
STATES MAY IN SOME RESPECTS APPEAR TO BE ARBITRARY OR AWKWARD, 
BUT IN FACT THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE BECAUSE OF THEM C M BE 
EXAGGERATED. 
NONE OF THIS IS MEANT TO SUGGEST THAT ALL THINGS ARE IDEALLY 
ORGANISED IN THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION. FOR INSTANCE, SECTION 
92 OF THE CONS TITUTIONWHICH PROVIDES THAT "TRADE AND INTERCOURSE 
BETWEEN THE STATES SHALL BE ABSOLUTELY FREE" IS A PROVISION WHICH 
MOST GOVERNMENTS AT SOME TIME WOULD LIKE TO BE MORE QUALIFIED. 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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IT MAY BE THAT IN THE FUTURE, A RADICAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM WILL BE REQUIRED; IN ITS ABSENCE, OR 
IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONSENSUS ON THE METHOD OF RESTRUCTURING 
TO BE USED, WE MUST MAKE THE SYSTEM WORK, AND MAKE IT 
RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS, DESIRES AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE 
OF AUSTRALIA. THIS REQUIRES INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 
ON A NUMBER OF LEVELS, BETWEEN BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 
AND ADMINISTRATIONS. IT MAY IN THE FUTURE REQUIRE SOME BASIC 
CHANGES TO THE BOUNDARIES OF SOME STATES. WHATEVER METHOD OF 
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION IS USED, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT 
THE ONE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT IS THAT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF 
ACCESS BY CITIZENS TO THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES MUST BE 
PROVIDED, AT ALL LEVELS IN THE SYSTEM. 
THANK YOU. 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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DR . K E L S A L E , MR. L O W E , ( L A D I E S AND) GENTLEMEN. 
THANK YOU FOR I N V I T I N G ME HERE TH IS E V E N I N G . 
I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SPEAK TO YOU ON COMMONWEALTH/STATE 
R E L A T I O N S H I P S . 
T H I S I S , FOR ANY A U S T R A L I A N STATE P R E M I E R , A F A S C I N A T I N G 
T O P I C , AND ONE WITH WHICH WE ARE QUITE F A M I L I A R . 
FOR INSTANCE I HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT COMMONWEALTH/STATE RELAT IONS 
IN E L E C T I O N CAMPAIGNS - OF HOW HAPPY THEY WOULD B E . 
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I HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT THEM IN CANBERRA - SAY ING HOW HAPPY 
THEY COULD B E . I HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT THEM WITH PRIME 
M I N I S T E R S - SAY ING HOW HAPPY THEY SHOULD B E . 
AND SO ON . . . AND ON. I DO NOT EXPECT THE S I T U A T I O N TO 
CHANGE. 
FOR IN A U S T R A L I A WE HAVE A FEDERAT ION OF WHAT A R E , 
T H E O R E T I C A L L Y , CO-EQUAL GOVERNMENTS. AND S I N C E IT I S , 
UNFORTUNATELY , OF THE VERY NATURE OF CO-EQUAL GOVERNMENTS 
IN FEDERAT IONS THAT SOME CONSIDER THEMSELVES MORE EQUAL 
THAN OTHERS, THE ARGUMENTS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY 
A R E , C A N BE EXPECTED TO CONT INUE . 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
.. ./3 
TENSIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS ARE I N E V I T A B L E IN F E D E R A T I O N S . 
THE TWO DEMOCRATIC FEDERAL SYSTEMS MOST COMPARABLE TO 
A U S T R A L I A ' S ARE C A N A D A ' S AND WEST G E R M A N Y ' S , AND BOTH OF 
THE5E SYSTEMS HAVE , AS AN INTEGRAL P O L I T I C A L FACT OF L I F E , 
VARIOUS PROBLEMS RELATED TO D I V I S I O N S OF POWERS WITHIN 
THE FEDERAL S Y S T E M S . THEIR ARGUMENTS AND CONCERNS ARE 
REMARKABLY S I M I L A R TO OURS. 
IN A U S T R A L I A WE HAVE A FEDERAL SYSTEM IN WHICH THE 
POWERS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ARE DEF INED IN THE 
FEDERAL C O N S T I T U T I O N . A L L POWERS NOT S P E C I F I C A L L Y INCLUDED 
T H E R E I N ARE IN RIGHT OF THE S T A T E S , AND FOR THE COMMONWEALTH 
TO ACQUIRE ADD IT IONAL POWERS, IT I S NECESSARY FOR A 
REFERENDUM TO BE HELD AND FOR THE PEOPLE OF A U S T R A L I A TO 
VOTE ON THE MATTER . 
FURTHER , THE CONST ITUT ION I S BY DES IGN QUITE HARD TO 
CHANGE. THE POWERS OF THE STATES ARE PROTECTED TO THE 
EXTENT THAT ANY A L T E R A T I O N IN THE NATURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH'S 
AUTHORITY MUST HAVE AGREEMENT IN A REFERENDUM NOT ONLY 
OF A MAJORITY OF THE P E O P L E , BUT ALSO A MAJORITY OF THE 
PEOPLE IN A MAJORITY OF THE S T A T E S . 
THE SYSTEM MEANS THAT WE HAVE A REMARKABLY CONSERVAT IVE 
C O N S T I T U T I O N . OF THE TWENTY SEVEN ATTEMPTS MADE TO ALTER IT 
S I N C E 1 9 0 1 , ONLY F I V E HAVE BEEN S U C C E S S F U L . THE PEOPLE OF 
A U S T R A L I A HAVE SO FAR BEEN QUITE RELUCTANT TO CHANGE THE 
STATUS OF THE S T A T E S , OR ENLARGE BY BALLOT THE R E S P O N S I B I L I T I E S 
OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, EXCEPT IN CERTA IN L I M I T E D WAYS. 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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T H I S RECORD, HOWEVER, I S IN CURIOUS CONTRAST TO THE GENERAL 
TENDENCY OF GOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES IN A U S T R A L I A . 
S I N C E FEDERAT ION THERE HAS BEEN A CONTINUAL D R I F T OF POWERS 
AND/OR OPTIONS TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN CANBERRA . THE 
MOST FUNDAMENTAL AND I L L U S T R A T I V E EXAMPLE OF T H I S PROCESS 
CAN BE SEEN IN THE UNIFORM TAXAT ION SYSTEM . THE STATES 
S T I L L HAVE THE POWER TO IMPOSE A FULL RANGE OF TAXES (WITH 
THE E X C E P T I O N OF CUSTOMS AND E X C I S E ) . HOWEVER, NO STATE 
GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO IMPOSE A SECOND SYSTEM OF 
TAXAT ION ON I T S P O P U L A T I O N , BECAUSE THE P O L I T I C A L D ISADVANTAGE 
OF DOING SO WOULD FAR OUTWEIGH THE CONST ITUT IONAL POINT SO 
G A I N E D . THE COMMONWEALTH IMPOSED, IN 1 9 4 2 , UNIFORM INCOME 
TAXAT ION AND IN DOING SO E S T A B L I S H E D P O L I T I C A L L Y AND L E G A L L Y 
I TS P R E - E M I N E N C E IN T H I S AREA IN IMPORTANT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
WAYS. 
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BUT THE I N T E R E S T I N G PART OF T H I S PROCESS I S NOT THAT IT HAS 
HAPPENED (OR I S H A P P E N I N G ) , BUT THAT I T HAS HAPPENED IN THE 
FACE OF A CONST ITUT ION WHICH PROTECTS THE S T A T E S , AND A 
POPULAT ION WHICH I S PREPARED TO DO SO A L S O . THUS , WITH 
VERY FEW E X C E P T I O N S , COMMONWEALTH/STATE R E L A T I O N S AND 
ACTIONS S I N C E FEDERAT ION HAVE BEEN DETERMINED MORE BY THE 
D E C I S I O N S OF THE VARIOUS E X E C U T I V E GOVERNMENTS AND THE 
COURTS, THAN BY THE PEOPLE IN A B A L L O T . 
HOWEVER, TH IS IS NOT N E C E S S A R I L Y A BAD P R O C E S S . 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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THE COMPLEXITIES OF A POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY REQUIRE THAT 
CERTAIN GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCIES BE ACHIEVED AND IF IT IS 
MORE EFFICIENT FOR, SAY, A COMMOFv/EALTH TRANSPORT AUTHORITY 
TO CONTROL AND DEVELOP THE NATION'S GOODS-RAILWAY SYSTEMS, THEN 
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE CLEAR ADVANTAGES IN TRANSFERRING 
STATE RAILWAYS TO THE COMMONWEALTH. (IN FACT, WE ARE PREPARED 
TO DO SO IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, PROVIDED THAT WE RECEIVE PROPER 
UNDERTAKINGS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH THAT PEOPLE IN RURAL AREAS 
WILL NOT BE DISADVANTAGED BY THE CHANGE AND THAT THE STATE 
RETAINS CONTROL OF THE INTRA-CITY PUBLIC RAIL TRANSPORT SYSTEM). 
PAGE 8. 
THE SAME KIND OF ARGUMENT CAN BE USED TO SUPPORT COMMONWEALTH 
INVOLVEMENT IN AREAS SUCH AS, SAY, ROAD MAKING, TERTIARY 
EDUCATION, OR URBAN DECENTRALISATION AND REGIONAL PLANNING. 
SUCH AREAS ARE NOT ONLY CAPITAL INTENSIVE, BUT THEY ARE ALSO 
SO GENERAL IN PRINCIPLE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN AN ADMINISTRATIVELY 
ADVANTAGEOUS If AY. 
IN FACT, ONE CAN THINK OF A GREAT NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTAL 
FUNCTIONS THAT ARE CARRIED OUT BY BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT, AND IN MANY OF THESE THERE IS NO CONFLICT BECAUSE 
THE SPECIFIC INTERESTS OF THE STATES ARE NOT AT VARIANCE WITH 
THE GENERAL INTEREST OF THE COMMONWEALTH. INDEED, IN A REAL 
SENSE THE TWO GOVERNMENTAL ROLES CAN BE AND ARE OFTEN 
COMPLIMENTARY. 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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TAKE THE ENVIRONMENT AND CONSERVATION, FOR INSTANCE. VERY 
FEW PEOPLE WOULD ARGUE THAT IT IS BETTER TO HAVE A DIRTY 
ENVIRONMENT THAN REQUIRE THAT PRIVATE INDUSTRY CLEANS ITSELF 
UP; AND VERY FEW PEOPLE WOULD ARGUE THAT IT IS BETTER TO 
ALLOW THE LAND AND PROPERTY MARKET FULL REIN AND THUS NOT 
BE RESPONSIVE TO CONSERVATION OR PLANNING VALUES IN THE " 
COMMUNITY. 
BOTH THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN AND COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS AGREE 
WITH THESE AIMS, AND AT PRESENT STATES LIKE MINE ARE ABLE TO 
RECEIVE ASSISTANCE FROM THE COMMONWEALTH IN THIS AREA. AND 
THIS I THINK IS AN IMPORTANT KIND OF QUALIFICATION TO BEAR 
IN MIND. 
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M E R E STATE AND COMMONWEALTH PRIORITIES ARE SIMILAR, IF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TENSIONS AND PROBLEMS EXIST, THEY ARE 
REALLY ONLY ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ARE QUITE EASILY SOLVED. 
BY AND LARGE, THIS IS BECAUSE, ON THE ONE HAND, THE 
COMMONWEALTH'S ACKNOWLEDGES ITS LACK OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE, 
WHILE ON THE OTHER, THE STATE RECOGNISES ITS LACK OF 
FINANCIAL POWER. 
HOWEVER, THE COMMONWEALTH'S CONTROL OF THE MAJOR TAXATION 
AREAS DOES NOT IN FACT AMOUNT TO AN OPEN TICKET FOR IT, 
IN A FUNDAMENTAL WAY, TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT 
OR ADMINISTRATION IN STATE AREAS. THE POLITICAL PRESSURES 
BROUGHT TO BEAR ON STATE ADMINISTRATIONS ARE OFTEN QUITE AS 
DIVERSE AND COMPLEX AS THOSE EXERTED UPON THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT. 
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THEY CAN, FOR INSTANCE, RANGE FROM THE A.M.A. TO INDUSTRY 
GROUPS ACROSS TO A SUBURBAN RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, OR A 
RURAL DISTRICT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. 
STATE PARLIAMENTS ARE LEGISLATIVELY COMPETENT (AND SHOULD 
CERTAINLY IN MY OPINION BE POLITICALLY COMPETENT) TO PASS 
GOOD LAWS ON MATTERS AS DIVERSE AS DRAINAGE AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, TOURISM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, TRAFFIC CODES AND 
CONSERVATION, TOWN PLANNING AND PUBLIC. HEALTH. 
I SHOULD CONTINUE THIS CATECHISM OF STATES' POWERS AND CONCERNS, 
BUT I THINK YOU WILL TAKE MY POINT. THE FACT IS THAT IN OUR 
FEDERAL SYSTEM THE POWERS AND CONCERNS OF STATE GOVERNMENTS ARE 
VERY WIDE AND COMPLEX, AND THEY DO NOT NECESSARILY AT ALL REFLECT 
THE POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL PRIORITIES OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. 
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IN FACT, AT TIMES THEY CAN BE REMARKABLY AT VARIANCE WITH THEM, 
FOR THE POLITICAL PRESSURES AND THE EXPECTATIONS OF ELECTORS ARE 
DIFFERENT FOR EACH GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA. 
THE PEOPLE AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS OF EACH STATE 
REQUIRE, FOR INSTANCE, THAT EACH STATE GOVERNMENT ENDEAVOURS TO 
MAINTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT AND PROSPERITY THROUGH 
ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIES AND MARKETS. 
A COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT, FOR ITS OWN POLITICAL REASONS, M Y 
BELIEVE THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS WOULD BE BETTER SITED ELSEWHERE. 
SUCH A SITUATION COULD BE A POTENT SOURCE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN 
GOVERNMENTS, ESPECIALLY IF OVERSEAS MARKETS OR INVESTMENT IS 
INVOLVED. 
THE NEED FOR REGIONALI3ATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IS THE 
ESSENTIAL ARGUMENT FOR A FEDERAL SYSTEM. IN A COUNTRY THE SIZE 
OF AUSTRALIA IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD EVOLVE. Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INTERESTS OE COLONIAL LEGISLATURES 
NATURALLY SOUGHT A SYSTEM M I C H PROTECTED THEIR POWERS AND 
jESROGATIVES. THE RIGGED OR TIME CONSUMING NATURE OF INTER-
COLONIAL COMMUNICATIONS AT THE TIME OF FEDERATION ASSISTED IN 
THIS PROCESS. THUS FEDERATION WAS ACHIEVED IN A FAIRLY 
PAINLESS WAY. 
BUT NOW, AFTER 73 YEARS WE ARE DISCOVERING THAT FEDERATION HAS 
ITS INHERENT DISABILITIES AMD INEFFICIENCIES. 
ON THE ONE HAND WE CAN HAVE A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WISHES 
TO COMMENCE PROJECTS OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE, BUT FINDS THAT ITS 
OTPIONS ARE LIMITED BY STATE GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION. ON THE OTHER 
HAND, WE CAN HAVE STATE GOVERNMENTS WRANGLING WITH THE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT - FOR PURELY PAROCHIAL POLITICAL GAIN. 
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IN ADDITION, WE CAN FIND THAT SOME PROJECTS MAY CROSS STATE 
BORDERS AND THUS INVOLVE TWO OR EVEN THREE GOVERNMENTS, WHILE 
IN THE MATTER OF RESOURCE USE, A STATE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY MAY • 
BE AT QUITE RADICAL VARIANCE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S POLICY. 
NOW THIS M Y SOUND VERY INEFFICIENT, AND IN MANY RESPECTS IT 
OFTEN IS. (FOR INSTANCE, IT IS OBVIOUSLY INEFFICIENT FOR THE 
NATION AS A WHOLE NOT TO HAVE UNIFORM COMPANIES LEGISLATION 
OR AUDIT PROVISIONS). BUT I WOULD LIKE TONIGHT TO ARGUE AN 
ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PROPOSITION, NAMELY THAT A LITTLE 
INEFFICIENCY IS OFTEN A GOOD THING. 
THE CONVINCED CENTRALIST USUALLY HAS TWO BASIC ARGUMENTS TO 
MAKE, THE FIRST BEING THAT STATE GOVERNMENTS ARE INEFFICIENT AND 
COSTLY, AND THE SECOND BEING THAT THE BIGGER THE GOVERNMENT THE 
BETTER AND MORE RESPONSIBLE IT IS. 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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BUT WHAT IS USUALLY MEANT BY EFFICIENCY IN THIS CONTEXT IS 
WHETHER X GOVERNMENT AGREES WITH THE POLICY OF Y GOVERNMENT 
AND WILL COOPERATE WITH Y IN ACHIEVING IT. IF X DOES NOT AGREE, 
THE FEDERATION IS INEFFICIENT AND UNNECESSARILY COSTLY. WHEN 
IT COMES TO THE SECOND ARGUMENT THAT THE BIGGER THE GOVERNMENT 
THE BETTER AND MORE RESPONSIBLE IT IS, WE ARE IN A SIMILAR 
SITUATION. IT IS THE PROPONENT OF A POLICY THAT TRANSCENDS 
STATE BOUNDARIES WHO WILL INSIST THAT BIGGER GOVERNMENTS ARE 
INTRINSICALLY BETTER, OR MORE RESPONSIBLE OR MORS EXPERT. 
TO MY MIND, NEITHER ARGUMENT CAN BE PROPERLY SUSTAINED. FOR 
INSTANCE MY GOVERNMENT IS SMALLER IN SIZE MINISTERIALLY AND 
ADMINISTRATIVELY THAN, SAY THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT OR THE 
GOVERNMENTS OF NEW SOUTH WALES OR EVEN QUEENSLAND. 
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AND YET OUR POLICIES ARE NOT INTRINSICALLY SMALLER, THOUGH 
PERHAPS TO IMPLEMENT THEM IS CHEAPER. 
THE DIVERSITY AND QUALITY OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM CAN BE WELL 
UNDERSTOOD IF ONE COMPARED SOUTH AUSTRALIA'S LACK OF HUMBUG 
IN RESPECT OF BOOK CENSORSHIP WITH QUEENSLAND'S QUAINT 
PRUDERY IN THE FLATTER. 
ALTERNATIVELY, COMPARE SOUTH AUSTRALIA'S URBAN CONSERVATION 
PROCEDURES WITH THOSE OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND VICTORIA'S 
STREET SITUATION. IT COULD NOT HAPPEN IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA. 
FOR REASONS LIKE THESE, THEN, GOVERNMENTAL DIVERSITY IN 
AUSTRALIA IS, I BELIEVE, A POSITIVE QUALITY, NOT A HINDRANCE. 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
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FOR EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE ARGUED THAT A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
SHOULD BE ENLIGHTENED AND EFFECTIVE, AND GIVEN THE GOVERNMENTAL 
AND LEGISLATIVE SCOPE, WOULD BE SO, THE ARGUMENT FOR A TRANSFER 
OF STATE PREROGATIVES TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST THIS 
PROCESS DOES NOT REALLY COVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A LESS 
ENLIGHTENED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EMERGING. 
DIVERSITY OF GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA EFFECTIVELY ENVISAGES 
THAT THE PEOPLE OF, SAY, WESTERN AUSTRALIA OR TASMANIA OR 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA ARE NOT SIMPLY DEALT WITH AS IF THEY ARE SOME 
VAGUE STATISTIC OF NO ELECTORAL. WEIGHT OR IMPORTANCE. 
IN EFFECT, THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATURES IN AUSTRALIA 
PROVIDE FOR A VERY HIGH DEGREE OF CONTACT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT 
AND CITIZENS. 
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MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT DO NOT, AS THEY DO IN FOR INSTANCE, THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, BALLOT TO ASK THEIR THREE OR SO QUESTIONS A 
YEAR OF THE GOVERNMENT. MEMBERS KNOW THEY ARE DEALING WITH THE 
INTERESTS OF A COMMUNITY IN WHICH THEY ARE PERSONALLY AND 
ELECTORALLY INVOLVED. THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN SOME OF THE 
STATES MAY IN SOME RESPECTS APPEAR TO BE ARBITRARY OR AWKWARD, 
BUT IN FACT THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE BECAUSE OF THEM CAN BE 
EXAGGERATED. 
NONE OF THIS IS MEANT TO SUGGEST THAT ALL THINGS ARE IDEALLY 
ORGANISED IN THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION. FOR INSTANCE, SECTION 
92 OF THE CONS TITUTIONWHICH PROVIDES THAT "TRADE AND INTERCOURSE 
BETWEEN THE STATES SHALL BE ABSOLUTELY FREE" IS A PROVISION WHICH 
MOST GOVERNMENTS AT SOME TIME WOULD LIKE TO BE MORE QUALIFIED. 
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PAGE 19. 
IT MAY BE THAT IN THE FUTURE, A RADICAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM WILL BE REQUIRED; IN ITS ABSENCE, OR 
IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONSENSUS ON THE METHOD OF RESTRUCTURING 
TO BE USED, WE MUST MAKE THE SYSTEM WORK, AND MAKE IT 
RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS, DESIRES AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE 
OF AUSTRALIA. THIS REQUIRES INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 
ON A NUMBER OF LEVELS, BETWEEN BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 
AND ADMINISTRATIONS. IT MAY IN THE FUTURE REQUIRE SOME BASIC 
CHANGES TO THE BOUNDARIES OF SOME STATES. WHATEVER METHOD OF 
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION IS USED, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT 
THE ONE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT IS THAT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF 
ACCESS BY CITIZENS TO THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES MUST BE 
PROVIDED, AT ALL LEVELS IN THE SYSTM. 
THANK YOU. 
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